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CASE COMMENTS
The principal case represents the modem tendency, to permit
real estate brokers to complete form contracts in their initial trans-
actions while restricting the preparation of deeds and other subse-
quent documents to lawyers. This approach attempts to balance
the public interest and public convenience. However, the West
Virginia court's definition of "practice of law" obviously indicates
that its primary concern is the protection of the public. Whether
the West Virginia court will follow the principal case appears
to depend on a future determination, based on Earley, whether
"prepares legal instruments" includes a mere filling in of factual
data in form contracts and must be completed by an attorney.
K. Paul Davis
Conflict of Laws-Long Arm Statutes-Sufficient Minimum Contact
for In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations
D, a corporation, loaded goods on a railroad car in California
destined for South Dakota. D2, a corporation, was in charge of
transporting the goods from California to Kansas where they
were placed on another carrier for transport to South Dakota.
Therefore, D2 had no contracts within South Dakota. P was injured
in South Dakota while unloading the goods. The injury was
caused by the alleged negligent loading and transporting of the
goods which occurred outside the State of South Dakota. P
brought an action against D1 and D2 for the injuries received in
South Dakota under South Dakota's "long arm" statute. The
statute provides that when a foreign corporation commits a tort
"in whole or in part" in South Dakota, against a resident, such
corporation will be subject to in personam jurisdiction. D1 and D2
moved to quash South Dakota's jurisdiction on the grounds that
they could not be reached under South Dakota's "long arm" statute.
Held, motions granted as to both D1 and D2 but with leave to
amend in respect to D1. Although the injury occurred within
South Dakota, the evidence failed to show that any of the events
in the causal chain leading to the injury occurred within that
state. Consequently, D1 and D2 did not have sufficient minimum
contacts to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.
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Marsh v. Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.S.D.
1966).
In the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff,' the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prohibits a state from acquiring in personam jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant simply by serving process upon
him outside the forum state or by publication. Due to the increas-
ing development of commercial intercourse between the various
states, the Supreme Court accepted the legal fictions of "implied
consent",2 "presence ,' and "doing business"4 as tests to determine
whether a state had complied with the due process clause in
obtaining in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. These
tests were discarded by the Supreme Court in the case of Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington,5 and the "minimum contact" test
was adopted. Under this test, a foreign corporation must have
certain minimum contacts within the territory of the forum state
before the foreign corporation will be subject to that state's in
personam jurisdiction. To establish minimal contact within a
state, "there must be some act by which the defendant purpose-
fully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its
laws".6 The theory behind the Court's reasoning was that if a
foreign corporation made these minimum contacts within the
forum state, the maintenance of the suit in that state would not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice".!
Under this flexible test, many states have been expanding their
jurisdiction over foreign corporations through their "long arm"
statutes.8 Several states have adopted "long arm" statutes similar
to that of the principal case which permit the forum state to
obtain in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if it
195 U.S. 714 (1878).
'Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Con-
necticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899); St. Clair
v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
1 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929); Green v. Chicago
B. & 0. R.R., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).4 American v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Rosen-
berg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
5326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).7 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8 Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1202 (1952).
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commits a "tort in whole or in part" within the forum state.' As
a result of the adoption of these statutes, the question has arisen
whether an act of negligence committed outside the forum state
and resulting in an injury within the forum state will constitute
sufficient minimum contact to satisfy the requirements of due
process.
Many of the cases which have been faced with this question
involve defective products manufactured outside the forum state
and sold within. These cases have used certain guidelines as aids
in determining whether the minimum contact exists. Factors
which have been considered are: (1) the nature and character
of the business; (2) the number and type of activities within the
forum; (3) whether such activities give rise to the cause of action;
(4) the special interests of the forum in granting relief; and (5)
the relative convenience to the parties."° The burden and incon-
venience of the corporation's defense of a suit in a foreign
tribunal has been regarded as of little significance, at least by
some courts," and the interest of the forum in granting relief to
one of its residents considered obvious. 2 Instead, the inquiry has
tended to focus on whether the nature of the business and the
extent of its activities should make it aware that its activities may
have consequences in a foreign state, i.e., the "reasonably fore-
seeable" test.' If the foreign corporation by its activity claims the
benefit and protection of the foreign state's law, then conversely
9 See Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923). The
discussion in the text is limited to those jurisdictions that have statutes con-
taining the phrase commits a tort, "in whole or in part", in this state. State
statutes which contain the words "tortious act" or "act or omissions" seem
to be more limited in scope than the statute in the principal case. Thus, the
constitutional issue of due process is seldom asserted. See Hearne v. Dow-
Badische Chemical Co., 244 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963). However, the
Illinois statute which contains the words "tortious act" has been given a very
liberal construction. For a discussion of the cases under the Illinois statute,
see Currie, The Growth of Long Arm, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533.
0 Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex.
1963) (valve manufactured by foreign corporation in foreign state shipped to
Texas where it caused injury); see Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d
187 (8th Cir. 1965).
11 Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., supra note 10; Anderson v. National
Presto Indus. Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965).
12The courts may find it more difficult to find a special interest in
granting relief to a nonresident. A long arm statute such as the one in the
principal case limits its application to its own residents. S. D. Laws 1961,
ch 27. However the language in the West Virginia statute seems to be appli-
cable to nonresidents. W.VA. CoDE, ch. 31, art. 1, § 71 (Michie 1966).
13 Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 276 Minn. 56,
124 N.W.2d 825 (1963); Anderson v. National Presto Indus. Inc., 135 N.W.
2d 639 (Iowa 1965).
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it should be subject to suit under the same laws. Hence, if a
corporation is national in character, in the business of mass pro-
duction and places its product on the market without regard to
state lines, it will be considered as doing business in any state
where its products cause injury."
The foreign corporation has been found amenable to the forum
state's jurisdiction in both cases of direct sales and indirect sales.
In the case of a direct sale, where the foreign corporation sells
its product directly to a dealer in the forum state, the courts
have little difficulty finding sufficient contact. These cases clearly
fall within the test of Hanson v. Denckla5 because the foreign
corporation has claimed "the benefits and protection" of the forum
state's law by performing "some act" within that state. 6 However,
in cases involving indirect sales-where the product is sold outside
the forum state and through subsequent exchanges in which the
original seller is not involved reaches that state-the court, in
determining whether there are sufficient contacts will be unable
to find "some act" by the defendant in the forum state. To assert
jurisdiction it must apply something akin to the "reasonably fore-
seeable" test."7
The principal case's holding that the mere fact of negligence
resulting in an injury in South Dakota without more would not
establish jurisdiction over the foreign corporations is consistent
with the decisions of other cases interpreting similar "long arm"
statutes. Thus, D2, a carrier, whose only participation in the
causal chain of events leading up to the injury is transport of the
goods outside, but not into, the forum state, cannot be subject
to in personam jurisdiction. The allegedly negligent loading of
the goods by the foreign manufacturer, D1'8 was also not suf-
ficient contact for jurisdiction. The court, however, by granting
leave to amend as to D1 indicated that the foreign manufacturer
could be subject to its jurisdiction. The manufacturer might have
14Ibid.; Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965);
Keclder v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. IMI. 1965).
15357 U.S. 235 (1958).
16Id. at 253.1 7 Gry v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IMI. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (valve sold outside state incorporated into
another product sold in forum state), 50 CEo. L. J. 310 (1961); see Anderson
v. National Presto Indus. Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965).
18It is assumed that D1 manufactured the goods even though it is
not expressly stated in the opinion. The basis for this assumption is that the
defendant manufactured the kind of products involved.
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been reached if the plaintiff had alleged that: (1) the foreign
corporation had entered into a contract to be performed in whole
or in part in South Dakota, or (2) that the foreign corporation,
by its direct sale into South Dakota, should have reasonably
anticipated that its negligence would have consequences in that
state. Concerning the second alternative, it is possible to dis-
tinguish the nature of the allegedly negligent act-negligent
loading-from the defective product cases. This difference does
not appear to be significant because in both cases the negligence
occurs outside the forum state and the defendant's contact is
based on the fact that his product is substantially connected with
the injury.
West Virginia's "long arm" statute provides for in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation "if such corporation commits
a tort in whole or in part in this State" The West Virginia
Supreme Court has never ruled whether an act of negligence
committed outside the state which results in an injury within
West Virginia will constitute sufficient minimum contact to enable
the court to acquire in personam jurisdiction. However, this por-
tion of the statute was interpreted by a United States District
Court in the case of Mann v. Equitable Gas Co.2" Here, a foreign
corporation manufactured pipe in Texas, and sold it to a gas
company in West Virginia, where it exploded, injuring the plain-
tiff. Under these facts, the mere occurrence of the injury did not
fulfill the requirements of the minimum contact test, and if the
statute were interpreted to confer jurisdiction in this case, it would
be in violation of the due process clause. The court stated "that
the commission of a tortious act within the state means that the
alleged tort feasor, or his agents were in West Virginia at the time
of his act, which is alleged to have resulted in this tort".2'
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court has not specifically
construed this section of the statute, the court has indicated that
the statute should be given a more liberal construction. In the
case of Gavenda Bros. v. Elkins Limestone Co.,22 the West Virginia
Supreme Court upheld the validity of a judgment rendered by
' 9 59 W. VA. L. Rxv. 369 (1957).
20 209 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. W. Va. 1962).
21 Id. at 574.
22 145 W. Va. 732, 116 S.E.2d 910 (1960).
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a court in Illinois, against a West Virginia resident, where in
personam jurisdiction was obtained through the Illinois' "long
arm" statute. The West Virginia Court recognized that the pur-
pose of the Illinois statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause of
the United States Constitution. The court then stated that he
purpose of West Virginia's "long arm" statute is in harmony with
the purpose evidenced by the Illinois statute. Another indication
that the court may give this section of the statute a liberal con-
struction is the decision in State ex rel. Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp.
2 3
Here, the court construed the portion of West Virginia's 'long arm"
statute that provides for in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation "if such corporation makes a contract to be performed,
in whole or in part, by any party thereto in this State".24 In this
case, an Ohio corporation entered into a parol contract with a
West Virginia citizen by telephone to be performed in West
Virginia. The Ohio corporation was not qualified to do business
in West Virginia, and none of its officers or agents came within
West Virginia in connection with the making or execution of the
oral agreement. The court, noting the clear trend toward ex-
panding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, nevertheless ruled that it would not be inconsistent
with the traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice to
subject the Ohio corporation to in personam jurisdiction in West
Virginia.
In light of this decision and the statement made by the court
in the Gavenda case, it is conceivable that the Mann case would
be decided differently if it were relitigated today.
Ronald Ralph Brown
Constitutional Law-Duty to Warn Accused of Rights on Arrest
D was arrested at his home by city police officers, was taken into
custody, was interrogated for two hours at the police station, and
signed a confession involving him in kidnapping and rape. D was
not informed at the time by police or others that he had a right to
counsel, either retained or appointed. At the trial, in which the
23 147 W. Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963).
24 W. VA. CoDE ch. 31, art 1, § 71 (Michie 1966).
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